Judge Sparks Dismisses All But One Constitutional Challenge to Texas’ Barber Instructor Licensing Scheme

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Brantley v. Kuntz, No. A-13-CV-872-SS, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2013)(Sparks, J.)

Brantley holds a certificate that permits her to braid hair for compensation, but she does not hold an instructor license nor a Class A barber license; thus, while she has taught braiding, her students have been unable to use her classes to satisfy Texas’ hair-braiding licensing requirements.  Slip op. at 4.  Brantley filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the Texas’ barber instructor licensing scheme, contending that it violates (a) the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, (b) the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and (c) the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.  Id. at 1-2.  The Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to Brantley’s equal protection and privileges or immunities claims.  Id. at 2.  She conceded that the latter claim was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).  Slip op. at 6.  And the District Court concluded that Brantley failed to state a viable equal protection claim.  Id. at 6-9.  Therefore, the District Court dismissed all but the unchallenged due process claim.  Id. at 9.

Civil Rights Claims Against Governmental Employers Face Tough Pleading Hurdle

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Henderson v. Killeen ISD, No. A-13-CV-471-LY, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2013)(Austin, M.J.)

This report and recommendation illustrates the challenging pleading hurdle a section 1983 plaintiff faces in suing a governmental employer based on an employee’s alleged misconduct.   In this case, a Killeen high school student claimed she had been roughed up twice by a school district police officer.  Slip op. at 1-2. Local governments are responsible for “‘their own illegal acts, and ‘are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employee’s actions.’”  Id. at 4 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011).  Where the challenged conduct was not the result of a decision or act by the employer, the plaintiff must show that the “‘practice was so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.’”  Id. (quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359.  Magistrate Judge Austin concluded that “[t]wo isolated incidents clearly do not constitute a pattern of unconstitutional conduct sufficient to hold KISD liable under § 1983.”  Id. at 6-7.  For that reason, he recommended that Judge Yeakel grant the school district’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Id. at 8.

Judge Sparks Dismisses Texas State Basketball Player’s Complaint Against School Officials

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Brown v. Texas State University System Board of Regents, No. A-13-CV-483-SS, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2013)(Sparks, J.)

This case pitted a former Texas State basketball player against the university, its governing board, and the individuals involved in his dismissal from the team and his other disappointments while a student.  Slip op. at 1-2, 5, and 7-26.  In this 34-page opinion, the District Court detailed its reasons for dismissing the dozen claims Brown asserted, as well as its reasons for denying Brown’s request for interim relief.